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A FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF  
HUMAN UNIQUENESS
Anthony Bolos
I challenge the assumption that human uniqueness of the sort motivated by 
the doctrine of the imago Dei is incompatible with contemporary views in evo-
lutionary biology. I first develop a functionalist account of the image of God 
and then argue that image bearing is a contingently imposed function. Hu-
mans, chosen by God to bear his image, are unique in that they alone possess 
an ideal range of image bearing capacities. This ideal range makes humans 
well-suited for the role of image bearing.
I. Introduction
In this paper I make two assumptions. First, I assume that humans are 
God’s image bearers.1 Second, I assume that contemporary views in evo-
lutionary biology are true.2 Assuming both to be true, however, presents 
an important challenge. The challenge, roughly, is to “explain—or even 
merely to describe—the special nature of humankind in the face of evolu-
tionary science.”3 Call this the problem of human uniqueness. The tension 
arises when we consider what it means to be both an image bearer and a 
member of the Homo sapiens species.
Before describing this tension, let me say something brief about human 
uniqueness. The creation account in Genesis is often used to motivate the 
1See Genesis 1:26–27. Note, when referring to “humans” I am referring to anatomically 
modern humans who are characterized by modern language, abstract thought, and other 
defining characteristics that separate us from other homo species. 
2Consider two brief points: First, I do not assume that the theory of evolution is mono-
lithic in the sense that there is one distinct thesis with which contemporary evolutionary 
theory is concerned. In this essay, though, I am primarily concerned with the relationship 
between humans being God’s image bearers and the idea that humans have evolved, for 
example, by process of natural selection (among other mechanisms). Second, “the theology 
of the imago Dei” could be more appropriately phrased “a theology of the imago Dei” given 
the various interpretations of the passage. The functionalist view I endorse below, though, is 
widely accepted within contemporary biblical scholarship. 
3Berry, “Did Darwin Dethrone Humankind?,” 61. 
pp. 326–344 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 35 No. 3 July 2018
doi: 10.5840/faithphil2018614106
All rights reserved
327A FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF HUMAN UNIQUENESS
idea that humans are unique.4 A quick glance at this account reveals that 
humans are wholly distinct from other animals and specially created by 
God to bear his image. There is little doubt from the creation story that 
humans are the pinnacle of the creation story. God, for example, speaks to 
humans, grants them charge over other parts of the creation, and clearly 
defines their role on earth. James Rachels puts it this way:
Man is special because he alone is made in the image of God, and above all 
other creatures he is the object of God’s love and attention; the other crea-
tures, which were not made in God’s image, were given for man’s use.5
Historically, many assumed that because of this special attention there 
must be something unique about humans. What is it about humans, then, 
that makes them distinct or qualitatively different from other species? 
Roughly, humans are thought to possess traits which other species lack. 
Many have thought that reason, for example, is what separates humans 
from other animals. Or perhaps it is the ability of humans to develop a 
special relationship with God which makes them unique. Whatever the 
reason, the special nature or uniqueness of humans is, then, measured by 
a real qualitative difference.
What, then, is the problem with human uniqueness on the evolutionary 
account? Briefly, the worry is that the story of evolution only allows for 
a difference of degree between humans and non-humans. As Charles 
Darwin famously said, “The difference in mind between man and the 
higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.”6 
If this is the case, there is no qualitative difference as is often assumed 
and humans do not possess a distinctive kind of intelligence. Now, this 
point might be hard to see when comparing humans to caterpillars. But 
when comparing humans to chimpanzees, Darwin’s point becomes more 
interesting. In ordinary language, we even speak as if these differences are 
merely a matter degree. We often say, for example, “Humans are more in-
telligent than apes” or “Apes are much stronger than humans.” This point 
is further illustrated when considering now extinct hominids who were 
much closer to modern humans than any living ape. These now extinct 
hominids used sophisticated tools, created music, technology, and art, 
which are all things we typically only attribute to the modern human.7 
But none of these other creatures are thought to be image bearers, despite 
4Human uniqueness is sometimes expressed in terms of value. The traits (or capacities) 
which humans possess are sometimes thought to reflect the nature of God. This is what 
gives humans value over and above other creatures. It is thought, then, that humans are 
intrinsically valuable in a way that other creatures are not. I am not, though, thinking of value 
in these terms and offer a different account below. For an excellent discussion on value see 
Matchulat, “Rationality and Human Value.” See also Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods. For a 
rejection of human uniqueness and value see Joshua Moritz, “Evolution.”
5Rachels, Created from Animals, 87. 
6Darwin, The Descent of Man, 151. 
7See Sawyer et al., The Last Human.
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some impressive similarities between us. This leads Moritz to argue the 
following:
Given the physical resemblance and behavioural similarities of these extinct 
hominids to modern humans, we must curtail any aspirations we might 
have to name one or a few unique characteristics that elevate Homo sapiens 
above and beyond all other creatures.8
The above points are important in this context. Given, at the very least, 
the capacities of early hominids, it appears that humans are not unique. 
And it’s plausible to assume that these differences really amount to de-
gree, as Darwin suggests. There is another point, though, that should be 
addressed. Setting aside the problem of early hominids, it’s not clear that 
human uniqueness can be motivated regarding more distant species ei-
ther. Often, human traits are thought to be “higher” or “better” and, at 
times, human uniqueness is motived by noting this distinction between 
species.9 Palaeontologist G. G. Simpson captures this sentiment well: 
“Man is an entirely new kind of animal in ways altogether fundamental 
for understanding of his nature. . . . Man is the highest animal.”10 The 
problem with this thinking, though, is that although the appearance of 
humans in Genesis represents something special in the creation narrative, 
the appearance of humans on the evolutionary timeline does not entail 
this. As Alex Rosenberg and Daniel W. McShea note, the Darwinian view 
is that “modern humans are not higher than modern worms. Both occupy 
the tips of the youngest twigs on a branching evolutionary bush, both have 
been evolving for the same amount of time, and therefore in a sense both 
are equally advanced.”11 Going further, they claim that modern biology 
is “thoroughly Darwinian” in this regard.12 The idea here is that all sur-
viving species, whether it be modern worms or modern humans, possess 
traits which are no “better” or “higher” than other creatures which have 
evolved. The reason for this is that all creatures, regardless of capacities, 
are aiming at the same thing: survival and reproduction. In other words, 
our traits have enabled us to do precisely what all living species excel at, 
namely, survival and reproduction. We are, in the end, all too similar to 
other animals.13
8Moritz, “Evolution,” 317. 
9Again, this is sometimes thought of in terms of value.
10Simpson, Meaning of Evolution, 284–285.
11Rosenberg and McShea, Philosophy of Biology, 127. 
12In other words, this position is central to modern biology.
13There is an objection regarding evolutionary progress which should be noted. For 
example, it seems that species do make progress through evolutionary change. And this 
progress is for the betterment of the species. If this is the case, then it might look like certain 
traits are in fact more valuable. This is a very complex issue and one that I’m going to set 
aside for this paper. See Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 309. Also, note that if one objects to 
the claims regarding uniqueness, the argument can be seen as a conditional one. Thus, even 
if we grant the claim that the differences between species are a matter of degree, there is still 
a way to account for human uniqueness. 
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Summarizing what we’ve said so far, here is how the argument against 
human uniqueness is put:
(1) If the doctrine of the image of God is true, then humans are unique.
(2) If evolution is true, then humans are not unique.
(3) Evolution is true.
(4) Therefore, humans are not unique. [2, 3]
(5) Therefore, the doctrine of the image of God is false. [1, 4]
One solution to this argument is to simply reject (1).14 By rejecting (1), both 
evolution and the doctrine of the image God can be held simultaneously 
without any conflict. Rejecting (1), though, comes at a significant cost. 
First, there is strong textual evidence from the creation account which 
points to the uniqueness of humans. Second, there is a rich tradition of 
understanding the text in exactly this way. So not only would you be re-
jecting what seems to be the most obvious interpretation, you are also 
rejecting centuries of theological tradition regarding the Genesis narra-
tive. And whenever possible, I think, we should work hard to maintain 
this tradition. I will argue, then, that (2) is false.
How, then, can we motivate the idea that humans are unique? First, I 
begin describing the most influential contemporary account of the image 
of God: the functionalist view.15 The functionalist view, roughly, argues 
that humans are called to be God’s representative here on earth.16 I then 
argue that the function of representing God is imposed contingently 
by God. Being human, then, does not necessarily entail being an image 
bearer.17 In other words, this ambassadorial role is something humans are 
elected or appointed to and not necessarily something they are in virtue 
of being a human. I then explain why humans are suitable for this role.18 
They are suitable because they fall within the ideal range of image bearing 
properties and this, in the end, makes them uniquely equipped for this 
role. This, I believe, accounts for the special nature of humans.
II. The Image of God: A Functionalist Account
There is no shortage of contemporary literature on the interpretation of 
Genesis 1:26–28. As Phyllis Bird notes, “Literature on the passage is now 
14See Moritz, “Evolution.” 
15As James Barr notes in his Gifford Lectures, the functional view is “doubtless the most 
influential opinion today” (Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 158). Others claim that 
the functionalist view has “come to virtually monopolize” Old Testament scholarship (Mid-
dleton, The Liberating Image, 29).
16We are, in other words, God’s ambassadors or vice-regents. 
17Some have argued, though, that the image is necessary and not contingent: “To be human 
and to be the image of God are not separable” (Clines, “The Image of God in Man,” 101). 
18One way to think about this is to ask why, of all the creatures that have evolved, are 
humans God’s image bearers? 
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boundless” and “shows no sign of ceasing or abating.”19 Adding to this 
“boundless” literature, of course, are the ideas of the patristic, medieval, 
and reformation writers, all of whom provide important insights into the 
nature of the image of God. Sometimes called the substantive view, many 
of these writers argue that the image of God is directly related to our 
ability as humans to reason. David Cairns notes that “in all the Christian 
writers up to Aquinas we find the image of God conceived as man’s power 
of reason.”20 Despite their uniformity, though, there are some interesting 
differences. Irenaeus, for example, argued that image and likeness repre-
sented two different facets of human nature that are linked to the image 
of God, with the latter being lost at the fall.21 And while Irenaeus does 
give priority to reason, he also stresses the importance of freedom and 
the physical nature of man. Augustine famously argues that the image 
of God was somehow related to the trinity, with the image consisting as 
a trinity in man—memoria, intellectus, and amor.22 And while Aquinas up-
held the tradition of seeing reason as essential to the image, he further 
argues that more rational creatures will bear more of the image of God.23 
With the reformers, however, there is a slight shift away from the substan-
tive view. Luther and Calvin, while not fully abandoning the substantive 
view, defended what they saw as both an Old Testament image and a 
New Testament image—the former being related to man’s original righ-
teousness and the latter to his restoration.24 So while Calvin, for example, 
found the image of God in the soul and believed the image to be related 
to knowledge, there was an important relational aspect as well. Being in 
right relationship to God was essential to image bearing and was hope-
lessly hindered by the fall and thus in need of restoration.25
Despite the appeal of the substantive view, there are, at present, two 
dominant interpretations of Genesis 1:26–28: the functional view and the 
Barthian-relational view (so called because of Karl Barth’s influential exe-
gesis of Genesis 1:27).26 The functional view argues that to be God’s image 
bearer is to be his vice-regent or representative here on earth (more on this 
below). The relational view argues that to be an image bearer is to have 
the ability, as humans, to enter a relationship with God. While biblical 
scholars largely favor the functional interpretation, the Barthian-relational 
19Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them,” 129.
20Cairns, The Image of God in Man, 110. 
21Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.6.1. 
22Augustine, De Trinitate, 8. 
23Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.93.2–I.93.10. 
24Even though both Luther and Calvin incorporated a relational aspect, Karl Barth 
lumped the Reformers together with the medieval view of the image. See Barth, Church Dog-
matics, v.3.1. 
25Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, I.15.3. For a nice overview of Calvin’s position, 
see Hoekema, Created in God’s Image, 42–49. For a different treatment of the reformed posi-
tion, see Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God. 
26Barth, Church Dogmatics, v3.1. 
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view is still popular with some theologians.27 A detailed look at these com-
peting interpretations is beyond the scope of this paper.28 My aim here 
is to provide an account of human uniqueness within the functionalist 
interpretation.29
The reason for my focus on the functionalist view is not only its popu-
larity, but also because there is compelling evidence for it. Consider first 
the royal language of the Genesis text.30 In Genesis 1:26–28, God’s image 
bearers are called to rule over creation and subdue the earth. Throughout 
the Old Testament these types of commands (ruling and subduing) are 
often seen as royal functions in that they are specially reserved for kings 
and rulers.31 Thus, in using this royal language for God’s image bearers, 
the author is noting that the role of humans on earth is primarily functional 
or missional. But what exactly is this function? It is, put simply, to represent 
God on earth. In representing God, humans both image God and are like 
him. God, the sovereign ruler of the cosmos, creates humans who will rule 
on earth. Put another way, “humanity is like this God, with the special role 
of representing or imaging God’s rule in this world.”32 This view, that hu-
mans have the function of representing God, is further motivated by the 
parallels between the Genesis narrative and other relevant ancient Near 
East (ANE) literature. To begin, the use of “image and likeness” in Genesis 
1:26–27 was not uncommon in the ANE literature and, as Middleton notes, 
“in some Mesopotamian examples the word used for ‘image’ is precisely 
the Akkadian cognate of the Hebrew selem.”33 This connection is important 
to the functionalist view given the way in which this imagery (the imagery 
of being “in the image and likeness” of God) is understood in the ANE. 
A commonly cited example from the ANE draws on similarities between 
kings and the statues they would erect of themselves in foreign lands. 
Kings, for example, would often set up images (e.g., statues) of them-
selves in lands where they, despite their rule, were physically absent. The 
authority of the ruling king was established by reminding the subjects, 
27See Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them,” 129. For a recent exegetical defense of 
Barth’s view by an Old Testament scholar see McDonald, “The Imago Dei and Election.” 
28For an overview see Middleton, The Liberating Image, 15–42. 
29These competing views are not mutually exclusive. As will become evident below, part 
of fulfilling the role of God’s representative involves the ability to enter a meaningful rela-
tionship with God. So, while I am committed to the functional view, much of what is argued 
here could also be applied to the relational view of the imago Dei. Also, I should note some-
thing about the substantive view mentioned above. While I reject (for exegetical reasons) the 
medieval view that the image implies similarity to God’s nature (e.g., reason), I do make use 
of the substantive view. There is, I think, something important about rationality (and form) as 
it relates to the image of God. Augustine and Aquinas, I believe, get this intuition right. The 
difference, of course, is that I see these features as essential only in terms of function. This 
will, I hope, become clear as the paper goes on. 
30See Anderson, “A Stylistic Study of the Priestly Creation Story.” 
31For more on this see Stek, “What Says the Scripture?” 
32Middleton, The Liberating Image, 26. 
33Middleton, The Liberating Image, 27. For more on ancient Near East literature and usages 
of Hebrew word selem see Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them,” 138. 
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through this image, who was in control. The parallels here should be clear. 
Humans are the image of God in the sense that they are the physical rep-
resentation of an invisible deity. Gehard von Rad famously puts it thus:
Just as powerful earthly kings, to indicate their claim to dominion, erect 
an image of themselves in the provinces of their empire where they do not 
personally appear, so man is placed upon earth in God’s image as God’s 
sovereign emblem. He is really only God’s representative.34
There is another important parallel that should be noted. This one, I 
think, is particularly compelling for the functionalist interpretation. In-
stead of kings merely setting up images (e.g., statues) of themselves in 
faraway lands, kings (and priests) in some ANE literature were said to 
be the image or likeness of their deity. Note, they themselves were not nec-
essarily divine, but were thought to be earthly rulers who were divinely 
appointed by their deities with the function of representing the aims and 
interests of their gods.35 Thus, when these kings or priests would speak or 
act, it was on behalf of the deities they were representing. It is these par-
allels, in conjunction with the royal language of Genesis 1, which account 
for the nearly unanimous agreement amongst biblical scholars regarding 
the meaning of Genesis 1:26–27.
If the function or mission of humans is to represent God, what does 
this entail? To get a better idea of what this amounts to, we need to return 
briefly to the royal language of Genesis 1 where God is creating the world. 
We noted above the parallels between ANE literature and the biblical con-
cept of the image of God. Another parallel should be noted: kings and 
priests, ruling from their kingdoms and temples, and God ruling from his 
temple or kingdom.36 When kings build their kingdoms and priests their 
temples, they are easily identifiable. But where exactly is God’s temple? In 
Genesis 1, God is creating his temple, or, some call it, his cosmic sanctu-
ary.37 The earth, for the author of Genesis, is God’s temple. And humans 
are a central part of the temple that God is creating. Humans are central 
in that they alone are “granted authorized power to share in God’s rule 
or administration of the earth’s resource and creatures.”38 Nahum Sarna 
illustrates this point further:
[The human is a] symbol of God’s presence on earth. While he is not divine, 
his very existence bears witness to the activity of God in the life of the world. 
This awareness inevitably entails an awesome responsibility and imposes a 
code of living that conforms with the consciousness of that fact.39
34Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, 60. Also, for my purposes “representing” God is synony-
mous with “mirroring” or “reflecting” God, and I will use them interchangeably. 
35See Clines, “The Image of God in Man” and Bird, “Male and Female He Created Them.” 
36For our purposes I will use these terms interchangeably. 
37For a rich discussion on this see Middleton, The Liberating Image, 77–88.
38Middleton, The Liberating Image, 27.
39Nahum Sarna, JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, 12. 
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Humans, then, have a responsibility to act on behalf of the God they 
represent. As God’s representative they have a duty to fulfill the aims of 
Gods kingdom and should align their affections with those of the God they 
represent. Fulfillment here is meant to convey the idea that God’s image 
bearers can aptly and dutifully carry out the tasks that image bearers are 
expected to perform. These acts might include particular commands that 
the image bearer is directed to fulfill. In Genesis 1:28, right after humans 
are said to be image bearers, we are given a glimpse of the expectations: 
“Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and have do-
minion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over 
every living thing that moves on the earth.”40 The fulfillment of task-ori-
ented commands, though, are not the only ways in which one fulfills the 
imago Dei. In other passages, humans are called to lead morally good lives 
just like the God they represent.41 They are, in other words, called to be a 
certain kind of image bearer. Call the fulfillment of these types of com-
mands “expression-oriented” commands. That God’s image bearers have 
a responsibility to fulfill both task- and expression-oriented commands 
should not be surprising given the picture of representation that is being 
defended thus far. Imagine, for example, a king who sends a representa-
tive to a distant land. This role, it seems, comes with certain expectations. 
One would expect, correctly I think, that the appointed representative be 
one who not only fulfills the task-oriented commands of the king, but also 
exemplifies the characteristics or qualities of the king. One way in which 
the fulfillment of expression plays out practically is that the representa-
tive would value (or at least have the ability to value) those virtues which 
are paramount to the king and his kingdom. Goodness, justice, and love, 
for example, might be the virtues that a representative would value if the 
king they represented shared these values. The argument then is this: the 
privilege of being God’s vice-regent on earth comes with certain respon-
sibilities and expectations. And among these expectations is the ability 
to fulfill the imago Dei. Humans, in the end, represent God in his cosmic 
sanctuary by fulfilling the expected duties of this role.
With the functionalist view in mind, there is one final point. There is no 
reason to assume, from an exegetical standpoint, that humans are neces-
sarily image bearers.42 It doesn’t follow from the text that because humans 
do in fact bear the image of God that they must bear his image. In fact, 
the position that humans are only contingently God’s image bearers fits 
well with the functional interpretation. Recall that on the functional view 
humans fulfill what is sometimes called an ambassadorial role. A natural 
way to understand this is that the ambassadorial role is something you are 
40All scripture passages are taken from the English Standard Version. 
41See, for example, I Peter 1:13–16. Even though “holiness” in this passage is directly 
concerned with humans being set apart, there are certainly moral ramifications which are 
relevant.
42See n. 7. Also, note that the functionalist account of the image of God is also consistent 
with humans being necessarily image bearers. 
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appointed or elected to and not necessarily something you are in virtue of 
being a human. Applying the royal language of the Genesis narrative, one 
becomes an ambassador because of skills and abilities which are valued 
by the king (and this in turn makes you a valuable asset to the kingdom). 
The idea is that the ambassador has these abilities before being appointed 
to this role. My understanding of the image bearer is similar in this re-
gard. The declaration of image bearing in Genesis is the announcement 
of a new role for humans—the beginning of an important relationship 
between God and humans. And this takes place at a time and point in 
history when God first revealed himself.43 Denis Alexander, writing on 
the earliest humans mentioned in the Hebrew Scriptures, notes something 
similar to what I am proposing:
God in his grace chose a couple of Neolithic farmers in the Near East, or 
maybe a community of farmers, to whom he chose to reveal himself in a spe-
cial way, calling them into fellowship with himself—so that they might know 
him as a personal God. It is not that there were no settled farmers before-
hand, but from now on here would be a community who would know that 
they were called to holy enterprise, called to be stewards of God’s creation, 
called to know God personally. It is for this reason that this first couple, or 
community, have been termed Homo divinus, the divine humans, those who 
know the one true God, the Adam and Eve of the Genesis account.44
God, in the same way that he called out Adam and Eve, made it known 
that a particular group of the created order were called to represent God 
here on earth. These modern humans, chosen by God to mirror him on 
earth, possessed all the skills and abilities which were essential for such a 
role. Being human, then, does not entail image bearing but is, importantly, 
only contingently connected with it.
III. Form as Fulfillment: Falling Within the Ideal Range
I am challenging the idea that humans, given evolution, are not unique. 
The case for human uniqueness hinges on the idea that image bearing is 
a contingently-imposed function, divinely imparted to humans by God. 
The question, then, is this: Why, of all the creatures which have evolved, 
did God appoint humans as image bearers? The reason, I argue, is that 
humans alone possess a set of unique features which makes them ideal 
image bearers in this environment. These features, when taken together, 
are both unique to modern humans and essential for image bearing 
responsibilities. These are, I believe, form and rationality.45 And it is the 
combination of these traits which makes humans the ideal image bearer 
43One could hold that once modern humans had all the appropriate adaptations (in-
cluding rationality) necessary for image bearing, they became God’s image bearers. Thus, 
any declaration was simply a recognition of what was already the case. Thanks to an anony-
mous referee at this journal for pointing this out. 
44Denis Alexander, Creation or Evolution, 236–237. 
45By “form” I mean corporeal form. “Rationality,” as I am using it here, refers to our cogni-
tive abilities as humans (our ability to reason, engage in abstract thought, etc.). 
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in this environment. If this is true (that form and rationality play an im-
portant role in the fulfilling the imago Dei), then there is another important 
point that will follow—there is a range of image bearing traits which are 
ideal for the image bearer to possess. This latter point will of course need 
to be defended. Roughly, I argue that that humans fall within an “ideal 
range” of image bearing properties and thus meet the conditions that are 
ideal for God’s image bearers.46 It is within this ideal range, then, that we 
discover the uniqueness of humans.
Let’s begin by considering what an ideal range of image bearing form 
looks like. We can divide creatures into two categories: those creatures 
with ideal form and those creatures who lack ideal form. Those creatures 
who lack ideal form can be said to have either deficient form or excessive 
form. So, for example, those creatures who lack certain corporeal features 
and are thus restricted from fulfilling the imago Dei can be said to have 
deficient form. And those creatures whose form allows for abilities well 
beyond any current ones in existence will also lack the ideal range for 
image bearing. In the end, those creatures who fall within the ideal range, 
as I am calling it, will have the ideal form to act as God’s representative 
on earth.
Taking these in turn, let’s first consider the idea of deficient form. In 
Genesis, the task-oriented responsibilities that God’s representatives are 
ordered to fulfill are clearly stated: “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the 
earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over 
the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the 
earth.”47 Now suppose there is a world where God’s representatives are 
blobfish. The creation story in Genesis has remained the same, but instead 
of God choosing humans as his representatives, the blobfish has been 
given this honor. True to its name, a blobfish is a gelatinous blob with 
no muscles. In fact, the blobfish spends most of its time in a stationary 
position waiting for its prey to float by. And lest some might think this un-
sightly creature is lazy, it is hardly his fault that he spends most of his time 
in the same place; after all, the blobfish is seriously restricted by its form. 
Given this, could one imagine the blobfish being God’s representative 
here on earth? Could the blobfish fulfill the commands that God’s image 
bearers are supposed to fulfill? Could a blobfish, given its current plight 
of being a gelatinous blob, really have dominion over the rest of creation 
and be the caretaker or overseer that God intended his image bearers to 
be? It seems, given what we know about the blobfish, that the answer is 
rather obvious—the blobfish, given its form, is not capable of fulfilling the 
responsibilities associated with image bearing.
46The notion of an ideal range here is similar to Aristotle’s hypothetical necessity. An axe, 
in order to fulfill the function of cutting stone or wood, must possess certain properties. Like-
wise, humans, in order to fulfill the function of image bearing, must also a possess certain 
properties. I am grateful to Mark Murphy for this example. 
47Genesis 1:27–30.
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Of course, it is not only the task-oriented responsibilities which the 
blobfish cannot fulfill. Given its form, the blobfish is also incapable of ful-
filling expression-oriented commands. If image bearers represent God by 
mirroring or reflecting him on earth, then, as noted above, there is an ex-
pectation that the image bearer exemplify the characteristics or qualities of 
the king. To see how deficient form is less than ideal for an image bearer, 
consider some of the ways in which humans reflect God through their 
expressions. Humans, like the God whose image they bear, are creative 
beings.48 And in this act of creating, we plan, develop, put together, take 
apart, etc. Our ability as humans to create varies and is not restricted to 
some physical category (e.g., building a house). The image, for example, is 
also expressed through entertainment, paintings, books, ideas (e.g., theo-
logical, political, philosophical), poetry, and so on. Humans also mirror 
God through expressions of love and kindness, whether offering a hug to 
someone in need or protecting those who are most vulnerable.
It seems clear, then, that corporeal form will play an important role in 
fulfillment. Even if the blobfish wanted to express the imago Dei—through 
some action like creating—the possibility of such a desire coming to 
fruition is unlikely.49 Of course, the blobfish isn’t alone in this category. 
There are thousands of other species whose form restricts them from 
being the ideal image bearer. Thus, when it comes to corporeal form, 
deficient form, as seen in case of the blobfish, is less than ideal for God’s 
representatives.
I take it that this point will be accepted without much resistance. There 
is a more difficult point, though, that needs addressing. What about those 
creatures who exhibit excessive form? What if, for example, humans could 
jump over mountains? Or better, what if their strength permitted them 
to pick up and move any mountains that were in their path? Wouldn’t 
these creatures have been just as ideal for God’s image bearers? After all, 
it could be argued that the more capabilities our corporeal form permits 
the better the representatives would be fulfilling the imago Dei. Now, so far 
as we know, there aren’t any creatures on this planet that have excessive 
form in the manner described.50 But imagine there exists creatures like, 
for example, Dr. Manhattan.51 Dr. Manhattan’s form allows him to walk 
through walls, frequent other galaxies, be in several places at once, and 
create complex matter without any effort. These creatures, with excessive 
48For an excellent discussion on the relationship between human creativity and the image 
of God see Watkins, Creativity and Sacrifice, 41–57. 
49Note the point here isn’t that certain creatures couldn’t fulfill the image of God in some 
way. Perhaps the blobfish, if it had the rational capacity, could show love or kindness in its 
own unique way. The idea, though, is that when compared to humans the range of fulfillment 
will always be less given its form. And, of course, this assumes that the blobfish has the nec-
essary rational capacities. In the end, the argument will hinge on the notion that representing 
God requires the perfect balance of image bearing properties. 
50Note that I am restricting my account to this specific environment. 
51Dr. Manhattan is a character in the graphic novel Watchmen by Alan Moore. His corpo-
real form allows him to do extraordinary things well beyond what any human can do. 
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form similar to that of Dr. Manhattan’s, are less than ideal image bearers. 
I offer two reasons here and then one in the next section. And while they 
are closely related, each reason could be independent of each other.52
First, creatures like Dr. Manhattan are too similar to the image they 
are bearing.53 Dr. Manhattan is, in a sense, too godlike. Image bearers are 
meant serve as viceroys who act on behalf of a sovereign. Not themselves 
be sovereign.54 Kings who send representatives to far off lands might ex-
pect these representatives to fulfill certain duties and express qualities 
valued by the king, but they do so recognizing that these expressions are 
just that—expressions which mirror those qualities valued by the king. 
They are imperfect at best and merely point towards the image they are 
bearing. There is a clear distinction between the creator and his creation. 
Image bearers with excessive form distort this important distinction.55
Second, if creatures like Dr. Manhattan were God’s representatives, then 
the world would be devoid of a certain kind of value—namely the value 
of achievements. Let’s call an achievement a success from ability. While a 
detailed discussion into nature and value of achievements is beyond the 
scope of this paper, a brief look into some of the arguments will serve for 
our purposes.56 First, let’s divide achievements into two categories: weak 
and strong. The latter is what most take to be valuable given the ease with 
which the former are realized. Consider the following example:
Mount Everest : Edmund and Didier both have a desire to summit Mount 
Everest. Edmund, who has been training for some time, successfully 
climbs Mount Everest by starting at the base. Didier, on the other hand, 
realizes his goal by taking a short and painless helicopter ride to the 
summit.
52That each point is independent is important in this context. Some, for example, may find 
some of the reasons more (or less) compelling than others. 
53Consider a point of clarification: I am concerned only with those excessive features 
which interfere unnecessarily with image bearing. It could be that having too much virtue 
is not a bad thing and would not interfere with image bearing (e.g., love). Thanks to Mark 
Murphy for pointing this out. 
54One could note that the gap between God and Dr. Manhattan types is, of course, still 
infinite. Thus, they are still very different. This is right, though keep in mind that in this 
environment (here on earth) their ability to easily fulfill the imago Dei is the same. In this 
regard they are too similar. Moreover, I take it that the task-oriented commands are also 
fixed. So subduing beasts for Dr. Manhattan requires no effort whatsoever. This is, it seems, 
too god-like for an image bearer. 
55An objection here could be the glorified bodies in the Christian tradition. After death, 
it seems that humans will have advanced physical capacities. This, to my knowledge, was 
never seen as a problem. Two points in response. First, the point regarding excessive abilities 
is in relation to the role as image bearers in this life. It’s not at all clear that humans will still 
serve in this capacity in the afterlife. It’s plausible that our service in this role is no longer 
necessary. Second, it’s important to note that the physical form of Dr. Manhattan is, more 
than likely, way beyond the glorified bodies of humans. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer 
at this journal for raising this objection.
56For a good discussion on achievements and epistemic value see Pritchard, “Knowledge 
and Final Value.” 
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To begin, it’s clear why we value Edmund’s achievement here. The effort 
and ability it takes to realize this goal is something we all recognize as 
great. Further, the obstacles that Edmund has overcome (fatigue, effects 
of high altitude, etc.) are also impressive. It’s clear, though, that Didier 
has also achieved something. After all, he did realize his goal by sum-
miting Everest. Perhaps he even demonstrated some skill by selecting a 
veteran pilot as opposed to a novice. Despite this, the achievements here 
seem different. The difference between these two types of achievements 
is that one seems to demonstrate great skill while the other is what we 
call an easy achievement.57 In terms of value, then, it is the strong achieve-
ment (the overcoming of obstacles, the demonstration of great skill, etc.) 
that we are after.58 Considering Dr. Manhattan, then, his excessive form 
does not allow for strong achievements in this environment. Dr. Manhattan 
has no obstacles to overcome when bearing the image of God. Some of 
humanities greatest creative achievements, like, for example, landing on 
the moon, come with little to no effort for Dr. Manhattan. It’s plausible 
that every task-oriented responsibility required of image bearers is no 
more difficult for Dr. Manhattan than a typical human raising their hand. 
His excessive abilities do, after all, allow for these possibilities. As a re-
sult, a world where God’s image bearers have excessive form is a world 
which lacks a certain kind of value—the value that is derived from strong 
achievements.59
In summary, then, there are two problems related excessive form. First, 
creatures like Dr. Manhattan are too similar to the image they bear. And 
second, the world would be devoid of certain kind of value—the value of 
strong achievements.60 Given this, Dr. Manhattan’s form is less than ideal 
for God’s image bearers.
IV. Rationality as Fulfillment: Falling Within the Ideal Range
Just as there is an ideal range of form, there is also an ideal range of ra-
tionality for image bearing. Those creatures who lack an ideal range of 
rationality are either deficient or excessive in their expressions. The points 
noted above regarding deficient form will apply here as well. Successful 
image bearing requires, at minimum, an understanding of the respon-
sibilities. Returning to the example noted above, imagine the blobfish is 
called to be God’s representatives. As God’s representative, the blobfish 
57Another example of an easy achievement would be raising my arm. In most environ-
ments, this would be an easy task. For most, the act of raising their arm is not something the 
requires great skill. 
58For more on this, see Duncan Pritchard, “Achievements, Luck, and Value.” 
59It could be that the bar of achievements would just be raised. That’s a fair point. But, I 
take it that the world would have to look very different if this were the case. There would be 
nothing, on this planet, where we are meant to represent God, for humans to achieve (if we 
are all like Dr. Manhattan). Achievements are environment relative. And in this environment 
(e.g., earth), there would be fewer (if any) achievements for Dr. Manhattan. 
60Or, at the very least, there would be far fewer achievements in the environment where 
image bearers are serving. 
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is expected to fulfill the imago Dei through both task-oriented and expres-
sion-oriented responsibilities. Given the level of rationality the blobfish 
has, however, it simply can’t fulfill the image bearing responsibilities. The 
blobfish lacks the reasoning power to understand and process even the 
most basic commands. Given its deficient rationality, then, the blobfish is 
a less-than-ideal choice as God’s representative on earth.
The above point should, I think, be conceded with little resistance. 
However, a more thorough discussion regarding excessive rationality is 
necessary. After all, it could be argued, like above, that stronger cognitive 
abilities (beyond the ones humans have, for example) are just as ideal for 
God’s representatives. Now, so far as we know, there aren’t any creatures 
on this planet that have excessive cognitive abilities. Imagine, though, that 
creatures like Dr. Manhattan existed. Like his corporeal form, his cogni-
tive abilities are extreme. He can for example, solve the most complex 
problems (mathematical, philosophical, etc.) with little to no effort. No 
question is too complicated, and every intellectual endeavor is met with 
ease.
Now, some of the arguments listed above could apply here. For ex-
ample, a Dr.-Manhattan-type creature with excessive cognitive abilities 
would be too similar to the God they are representing. Also, excessive cog-
nitive abilities would rob the world of a certain kind of value—the value of 
achievements. There is, though, another worry with excessive rationality. 
As image bearers, humans are called to be in communion with all of cre-
ation. I am interpreting this idea of communion broadly here to include, for 
example, a dependency on others, vulnerability towards each other, and, 
importantly, the ability to relate to all of God’s creatures (e.g., the ability 
to relate to the suffering of others). God’s image bearers are not called 
to be isolated or indifferent towards creation, but engaged and caring.61 
Excessive rationality, though, could rob God’s image bearers of the desire 
to be in communion with all of creation. Dr. Manhattan-type characters 
are otherworldly and are thus totally self-sufficient in this environment.62 
The concerns of everyday life are trivial, just like the inhabitants he is bur-
dened to interact with daily. The creators of Dr. Manhattan’s character tap 
into this notion by creating a character who, while displaying extreme 
cognitive abilities, is bored with life and those around him. In a telling 
scene where the Comedian (like Dr. Manhattan, a character in Watchmen) 
guns down an innocent woman, Dr. Manhattan stands idly by. When Dr. 
Manhattan is challenged as to why didn’t intervene, he is faced with the 
reality that he has lost touch and simply doesn’t care enough about hu-
mans. This is a recurring theme in the novel. Dr. Manhattan’s cognitive 
abilities are so extreme that he finds it almost impossible to empathize 
61There is some interesting research regarding the relationship between high levels of 
intelligence and relationships (e.g., how the former negatively affects the latter). For recent 
treatment on this topic, see Li and Kanazawa, “Country Roads.” 
62I again stress the importance of the environmental relativeness of image bearing. The 
reason is that image bearers are called reflect God here on earth, in his cosmic sanctuary. 
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with humanity. He displays total indifference towards humans, is wholly 
uninterested in the affairs of this world, and has little time to develop real 
relationships. He is an isolated individual who lives and interacts with a 
creation who craves community. This, in the end, proves too much and 
Dr. Manhattan leaves this galaxy for one “a little less complicated” (where 
presumably he will not need to interact with humans).
This is in stark contrast to what humans (God’s image bearers) are 
called to do. God’s image bearers should seek to understand this creation, 
not grow tired or weary in the face of injustice. An image bearer with Dr. 
Manhattan’s cognitive ability makes this function of the image unneces-
sarily difficult. As a result, then, excessive rationality is less than ideal for 
God’s image bearers. And a robust account of the imago Dei will be one 
where, I believe, rationality is neither deficient nor excessive. It will, in the 
end, fall within an ideal range.63
V. Conclusion: Human Uniqueness and the Story of Evolution
At the beginning of the essay we set out to describe the way in which 
humans maintain their uniqueness in the face of evolutionary science. The 
answer to this question is linked, I believe, to an important question: Why, 
of all the creatures who have evolved, are humans God’s image bearers? 
Put simply, humans possess an ideal range of both form and rationality 
which serves them well in the function of image bearing. And in relation to 
other earthly creatures that have evolved, it is humans alone who uniquely 
possess the ideal combination of these two qualities. Human uniqueness, 
then, can be seen in the following way: humans uniquely possess, in 
perfect balance, the combination of ideal form and ideal rationality. It is 
the unique ability of humans to serve in this role which sets them apart 
from other creatures. The difference, then, is not only measured in terms 
of degree. To see this, consider the following analogy. Suppose you have 
two objects where the difference is only a matter of weight. Intrinsically, 
then, the difference might only be measured in terms of degree. Though, 
if you are looking for a paperweight, only the heavier object will do. This 
is because only one of them possesses the quality of being a good paper-
weight. I am arguing for something similar regarding human uniqueness. 
Within evolution it looks as if our differences are, at times, only a matter 
of degree. But unlike other creatures that have evolved, only humans pos-
sess the qualities necessary to be the ideal image bearer. Humans are, put 
simply, uniquely equipped and apt to serve as image bearers of God.
63I am not assuming there is a necessary tension between extreme cognitive abilities and 
well-being. I do, however, think there are certain environments where this tension more 
easily arises. An example might be an environment where all the creatures you are called to 
serve suffer in ways which are wholly unfamiliar to you. Or, perhaps, an environment where 
all the creatures you are called to serve have needs and desires which you find utterly trivial. 
Of course, humans, as God’s image bearers, might struggle with these things as well. But 
not, it seems, to the extent that Dr. Manhattan types do. For these reasons, I take humans to 
possess a more ideal range of rationality. 
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Before closing, there are two questions which need to be addressed. 
First, there is the question of rationality and extinct hominids. Second, 
there is the question of humans who fall outside the ideal range. I will take 
these in turn.
V.A. Ideal Range and Extinct Hominids
One criticism of the above account is that there are certain creatures 
who do in fact come close to resembling modern humans. Take, for ex-
ample, now extinct hominids. These extinct hominids possess an ideal 
range of form and, given my very broad definition of rationality, might 
also possess a sufficient range of rationality.64 These early hominids were 
not, though, image bearers. First, note that what we are really asking is 
why God would choose modern humans and not, for example, other 
similar Homo species to represent him on earth. The reason given above 
(as to why God chose humans) is that humans alone possess the unique 
range of ideal image bearing capacities. This is true, I think, even when 
comparing those hominids who are very similar to the modern human. 
While early hominids did display some cognitive abilities, these abilities 
were, compared to modern humans, still quite primitive (especially, for 
example, with regard to language). These primitive features, however few 
they possessed when compared to the modern human, were not ideal for 
image bearing. This might mean that certain aspects of the ideal range are 
to be interpreted very narrowly. In other words, early hominids might 
have possessed many of the ideal capacities for image bearing, except for 
language. Their primitive language, though, would put them outside the 
ideal range. This narrow understanding of the ideal range (at least for cer-
tain aspects) should not come as a surprise since representation involves 
mirroring God. And when mirroring God, especially with regard to ful-
filling expression-oriented tasks, the required capacities do indeed seem 
very narrow.
Let’s look at a concrete case of an early hominid: Neanderthals. Nean-
derthals, while certainly possessing an ideal range of form, lacked certain 
features which make them less-than-ideal image bearers. They lacked, for 
example, the language abilities of modern humans.65 And this, as noted 
above, is essential for fulfilling both task-oriented and expression-oriented 
commands. Our ability as humans to develop and complete complex proj-
ects depends, to some extent, on our ability to communicate effectively.66 
The sorts of things that humans achieve are due, in part, to our advanced 
language skills. Further, it was also the lack of certain abilities which led 
64Above, I define rationality only as it pertains to our cognitive abilities as humans (our 
ability to reason, engage in abstract thought, sophisticated language, etc.). There is an in-
teresting debate here regarding first and second order rationality. For a nice overview, see 
Matchulat, “Rationality and Human Value,” 407–412. Also, see Geach, Truth and Hope, 17–23.
65The language abilities of Neanderthals (and other homo species) is one of constant de-
bate. See Benítez-Burraco and Barceló-Coblijn, “Paleogenomics.” 
66For the role of language in human evolution see Morgan et al., “Experimental Evidence.” 
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to their extinction. They simply could not compete for resources with 
modern humans. They were not, in the end, well-equipped for survival in 
their own environment.67 Thus, for the same reasons that lions, blobfish, 
and the highland cow lack the sufficient capacities for ideal image bearing, 
so then did these early hominids. Of course, compared to those creatures 
just mentioned, it’s clear that extinct hominids are far better candidates 
for image bearers. This is right. But when compared to humans in this 
environment, these early hominids were not chosen to image God because 
they lacked some important feature of image bearing.
V.B. Humans Outside the Ideal Range
If humans are God’s image bearers because they are well suited to image 
God, then what of those humans who fall outside the ideal range? There 
are humans with severe disabilities, both cognitively and corporeally, who 
cannot, because of these disabilities, fulfill the image of God in the ways 
described above. It would be incorrect, I think, to only assume that those 
with no disabilities image God.
First, note that this is a problem for all accounts of the image of God. 
The medieval theologians who tied the image directly to rationality must 
also account for those with disabilities. The relational account is not off 
the hook either. Those who do not have the cognitive abilities to enter 
meaningful relationships cannot bear God’s image. And while this is also 
a problem for the functionalist account, it is well positioned to answer 
this objection. In the Genesis narrative, it’s clear that humans, as a species, 
are designated as God’s image bearers. And most biblical scholars have 
interpreted the text in just this way. In other words, the election of hu-
mans to this ambassadorial role is corporate. Humans, as a species, are a 
community of image bearers whose traits enable them to fulfill the image 
of God in ways which other creatures cannot. Thus, when humans were 
given the role of representing God, it was not based on the individual ca-
pacities of each human but on the usual capacities of the collective species. 
Humans do, for the most part, fall within the ideal range described above. 
Thus, given the corporate nature of this election, even those humans who 
fall outside the ideal range of image bearing capacities still image God. 
They bear the mark of election in the same way as those do fall within the 
ideal range.68
In conclusion, some might resist contemporary views in evolutionary 
biology for philosophical and theological reasons. As it relates to the 
image of God, the worry is that evolution challenges the long-standing 
tradition of human uniqueness. The primary aim of this paper, then, is 
to alleviate this worry and show that it is reasonable to embrace both 
human uniqueness and contemporary science. Removing this obstacle is, 
67Image bearers should be, on the other hand, well equipped to live and rule in this envi-
ronment. See Stewart and Stringer, “Human Evolution Out of Africa.” 
68Further, humans with disabilities still have an active role in imaging God, for example 
by directly mirroring God through their loving interactions with others.
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I think, an important step for those who wish to retain the rich theological 
tradition of the text while also staying true to important discoveries in 
contemporary science.69
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